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Abstract
Background: Monitoring financial protection against catastrophic health expenditures is important to understand
how health financing arrangements in a country protect its population against high costs associated with accessing
health services. While catastrophic health expenditures are generally defined to be when household expenditures
for health exceed a given threshold of household resources, there is no gold standard with several methods
applied to define the threshold and household resources. These different approaches to constructing the indicator
might give different pictures of a country’s progress towards financial protection. In order for monitoring to
effectively provide policy insight, it is critical to understand the sensitivity of measurement to these choices.
Methods: This paper examines the impact of varying two methodological choices by analysing household expenditure
data from a sample of 47 countries. We assess sensitivity of cross-country comparisons to a range of thresholds by testing
for restricted dominance. We further assess sensitivity of comparisons to different methods for defining household
resources (i.e. total expenditure, non-food expenditure and non-subsistence expenditure) by conducting correlation
tests of country rankings.
Results: We found country rankings are robust to the choice of threshold in a tenth to a quarter of comparisons within
the 5–85% threshold range and this increases to half of comparisons if the threshold is restricted to 5–40%, following
those commonly used in the literature. Furthermore, correlations of country rankings using different methods to define
household resources were moderate to high; thus, this choice makes less difference from a measurement perspective
than from an ethical perspective as different definitions of available household resources reflect varying concerns for
equity.
Conclusions: Interpreting comparisons from global monitoring based on a single threshold should be done with
caution as these may not provide reliable insight into relative country progress. We therefore recommend financial
protection against catastrophic health expenditures be measured across a range of thresholds using a catastrophic
incidence curve as shown in this paper. We further recommend evaluating financial protection in relation to a
country’s health financing system arrangements in order to better understand the extent of protection and better
inform future policy changes.
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Background
There is increasing interest in monitoring the impact of
household health expenditures on living standards. This
interest is growing because financial protection is a key
component of universal health coverage (defined as every-
one receiving the health services they need and protected
from financial hardship in doing so), an agreed target for
health in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [1].
Global-level monitoring is of particular interest as it allows
benchmarking a country’s progress relative to others and
encourages global dialogue and the exchange of country
experience. Country-level monitoring is also of particular
interest to understand progress over time or differences
across sub-national levels, thereby helping to inform future
policy reforms. The methodological analysis presented here
is concerned with monitoring at the global level and
focuses on comparisons across countries. Regardless of the
level of monitoring, there is need for an indicator that leads
to unambiguous assessments of comparative progress.
Monitoring financial protection typically relies on two
indicators – catastrophic health expenditures associated
with out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for health reducing
people’s ability to spend on other essential items, and
impoverishing health expenditures associated with OOP
payments for health pushing or further pushing people
into poverty. Both indicators are thus concerned with
the impact of OOP payments, defined as those payments
that patients make directly to health providers at the
time of service. They include cost-sharing and informal
payments (in kind and in cash) but exclude payments by
a third-party payer [2]. This paper focuses on the former
indicator of catastrophic health expenditures which
monitors when OOP payments as a share of household
resources reaches and/or surpasses a certain threshold.
Choices in measuring this relate both to the definition of
household available resources (denominator) and to the
threshold (percentage) used to determine when the OOP
share on health is catastrophic. There is no established
gold standard for either, with considerable debate over
the last decade. Earlier discussions focused on the
definition of available household resources [3–5]. More
recent discussions concerned the choice of the threshold
[6–8]. In the absence of consensus, studies of cata-
strophic health expenditures frequently present results
using multiple definitions of household resources and
various thresholds [9–11].
For global monitoring to be meaningful for policy, it is
important to understand if a country’s performance rela-
tive to that of another is insensitive to varying methodo-
logical choices. Does the assessment that a country has
higher levels of financial protection than another depend
on the method used to define available household
resources? Does it also depend on the specific threshold?
If the answer to one and especially to both is yes, then
making sense of cross-country comparisons to draw
conclusions about the relative performance of health
financing systems becomes more challenging.
The objective of this paper is to assess the sensitivity
of comparisons of country-level estimates of financial
protection against catastrophic health expenditures to
different methodological choices in indicator construc-
tion. In this analysis, sensitivity is assessed by the extent
to which orderings of distributions of financial protec-
tion against catastrophic health expenditures across
countries are consistent, irrespective of the threshold,
and correlated, irrespective of the method for defining
household resources. We adapted methods to test for
restricted dominance. These methods have previously
been applied in the measurement of poverty to assess
sensitivity of poverty incidence rates to the choice of the
poverty line [12], and have more recently been studied
as a means to assess the sensitivity of the incidence of
catastrophic health expenditures to the choice of the
threshold [8, 13]. This empirical paper is one of the first
to apply such methods to assess the impact of varying
methodological choices on global monitoring of financial
protection. It demonstrates whether these choices mat-
ter, provides new insight into challenges for monitoring,
and recommends a way forward for measuring financial
protection beyond conventional approaches.
Conceptual underpinnings
The concept of financial protection rests on the theoret-
ical foundations of insurance and the economic value of
reduced uncertainty or financial risk of being exposed to
large healthcare costs [14, 15]. Health insurance, whether
run by governments, nongovernmental organizations,
communities or commercial companies, seeks to reduce
this risk for the individual; when a country’s health finan-
cing arrangements fail to adequately provide this insur-
ance function, access to health services will either be
foregone or privately financed through OOP payments.
The concern of catastrophic health expenditures is with
the negative impact that OOP payments can have on
economic well-being, for example when an individual
forgoes consumption of other necessities (e.g. food) to pay
for health. It is identified by comparing OOP payments
for health to some definition of household resources and
whether these surpass a certain threshold.
Thus, in measuring catastrophic health expenditures,
there are two methodological choices. The first is the
definition of household resources available to pay for
health services. The second is the threshold used to
identify health expenditures as catastrophic.
Defining household resources follows two main
approaches, differing in whether they account for non-
discretionary spending [16]. In the ‘budget share approach’
household resources are defined in relation to a household’s
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total budget without distinguishing spending on necessities.
This approach is easy to understand and requires no
further calculation. A further advantage is that it is not
dependent on household allocation decisions across discre-
tionary and non-discretionary items. However, it fails to
distinguish between populations who just manage to meet
subsistence needs with little or nothing left for discretionary
expenditures and richer groups who have more latitude in
discretionary spending.
The ‘capacity-to-pay (CTP) approach’ addresses this
limitation, recognising that poorer households spend a
higher proportion of available resources on essential items
than richer households. It thus defines household re-
sources as net of such spending. The idea is that spending
on other basic necessities should not be considered part of
resources available for health. CTP can be defined in vari-
ous ways but commonly includes a component related to
food spending. One well-established method defines this
as total expenditures net of all food spending [16]. While
its calculation is simple, a limitation of this method is that
it does not recognise that some food spending is discre-
tionary. Another popular method, proposed by Xu et al.
(2003) [17], approximates the non-discretionary part of
food spending as average food expenditure per equivalent
adult across households in the 45th–55th percentile of the
food budget share distribution. When actual food spend-
ing is below this amount, CTP is defined as total expend-
iture net of actual food spending. Any expenditure above
this fixed subsistence expenditure amount is considered
discretionary and available for spending on other goods
and services, including health. These two CTP methods
are conceptually similar but the latter adopts a stricter as-
sumption of what is non-discretionary. It could thus be
argued to more accurately estimate CTP of populations at
the bottom of the income distribution. Critics of the Xu
et al. (2003) [17] method argue that its definition of subsist-
ence expenditure is not based on a normative standard (e.g.
a food consumption basket) and that it can mean that a
poorer household is judged to have greater CTP than a
richer one1 [18, 19]. Further discussions on CTP ap-
proaches, including their conceptual underpinnings, exist
elsewhere [20].
Other choices can be made in the definition of house-
hold resources. For example, whether this should be
measured by consumption expenditure or by income
[21], whether OOP should be included in the measure
or netted out as it does not increase welfare [22], and
whether other categories of expenditure, such as hous-
ing and utilities, should also be considered as essential
in a CTP approach [23]. Measuring household re-
sources using income was not explored in this analysis
as the implications have already been studied elsewhere,
and some seminal literature suggests that consumption
is the preferable measure given it smooths fluctuations
during periods of high and low income [24, 25]. Fur-
thermore, it has been shown that the choice matters
less when measuring national incidence rates of cata-
strophic health expenditures (as done in this paper)
than when measuring inequalities across socio-
economic groups [20]. We also do not consider the
other two additional CTP variants in this paper as
currently they are not as commonly used in the
measurement of catastrophic health expenditures.
The second methodological choice in measuring protec-
tion against catastrophic health expenditure is the threshold
used to define catastrophic OOP payments. Any such
threshold is a normative choice. The choice is based on the
idea that households who are spending above the threshold
on health are left with a certain balance of their expenditure
to spend on other essential items [15, 26]. Too low a
threshold fails to capture a level of spending that causes
households to forgo such items. Too high a threshold fails
to capture small amounts of spending by the poor that are
nonetheless catastrophic. Catastrophic thresholds in pub-
lished studies typically vary between 10% and 40% depend-
ing on the definition of household resources, with a lower
threshold used in the budget share method and a higher
threshold in CTP methods [9, 27–31]. Typically a single
threshold is uniformly applied across the population, but it
can also vary such that a lower threshold is used for the
poor and a higher threshold for the rich [6, 7].
Methods
This analysis relied on household expenditure survey data
from a sample of 47 countries over 2000–2012
(Additional file 1). This convenience sample was composed
of nationally representative household survey datasets
which the authors had access to and which had information
on total consumption expenditure, including on OOP pay-
ments for health. The dataset represents a diverse spectrum
of countries at different levels of economic development in-
cluding low-, middle- and high-income countries, countries
belonging to all five United Nations regional groups, and
countries with diverse financing arrangements ranging
from insurance schemes run by governments, nongovern-
mental organizations, or communities. Data provided infor-
mation on household-level consumption expenditure
which was aggregated into three expenditure variables
(total, food, health). Total expenditure was estimated from
monetary and in-kind payments on all goods and services
plus the monetary value of consumption of homemade
products. Food expenditure included items purchased and
consumed from own production. Health expenditure con-
sisted of OOP payments made by individuals to health pro-
viders at the time of service. All data were quality checked
for missing values of the three aggregated expenditure vari-
ables and for illogical values (e.g. total expenditure<food
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expenditure). The frequency of such observations was min-
imal and these were dropped from the dataset.
For each household in each country dataset, three
health expenditure ratios were constructed as the
share of OOP payments for health in total expend-
iture, total expenditure net of all food expenditure,
and total expenditure net of subsistence expenditure
on food (Table 1).
To analyse the extent to which country comparisons
were sensitive to the choice of the catastrophic thresh-
old, we adapted a restricted dominance approach de-
scribed by Flores et al. (see Additional file 2) [8, 13]. The
dominance approach was originally developed in the
measurement of inequalities comparing differences be-
tween two Lorenz (or concentration) curves to deter-
mine if the cumulative distribution of income (or other
variable of interest) is always above the other, indicating
the more preferred distribution on welfare grounds be-
cause the degree of inequalities is unambiguously less.
Since then, dominance has been applied in the measure-
ment of poverty to overcome limitations given that com-
parisons of poverty levels are sensitive to the choice of
the poverty line [32–34]. By examining distributions of
income across a specified range of poverty lines, re-
stricted dominance thus allows for ranking distributions
of poverty levels that are insensitive to the choice of the
poverty line. Dominance is said to be restricted as it per-
tains to part of but not the full income distribution (i.e.
given the focus is on the poor, particular interest is on
the lower part of the distribution). Restricted dominance
for poverty can be visualised by plotting on the vertical
axis the incidence rate for poverty associated with mul-
tiple poverty lines over a specified range of the income
distribution which are plotted on the horizontal axis.
The resulting cumulative distribution function has been
referred to as a ‘poverty incidence curve’ [21]. Compara-
tive assessments of poverty distributions thus exhibit re-
stricted dominance when, no matter the choice of the
poverty line within the defined interval, one distribution
of the incidence of poverty is always below another distri-
bution [12, 32]. In other words, as assessed through statis-
tical tests, the poverty incidence curves do not cross.
Analogous to this application of dominance to the
measurement of poverty, distributions of catastrophic
health expenditures can also be examined for restricted
dominance. Indeed, measurement of catastrophe is similar
to that of poverty as both rely on a defined benchmark (a
poverty line in the case of poverty and a threshold in the
case of catastrophe), and both are focused on a specific
part of the distribution (the lower distribution of income
in the case of poverty and the higher share of OOP pay-
ments for health in household resources in the case of ca-
tastrophe). The distributions of catastrophic OOP shares
can also be visualised by plotting incidence rates of cata-
strophic health expenditures against a range of thresholds,
resulting in a curve first referred to by Wagstaff as a ‘cata-
strophic spending curve’ [35]. Such a curve corresponds
to a descending cumulative distribution function (CDF)
and is denoted as 1 − FOOP_share where FOOP_share(τ) ≡
Prob(OOP_share ≤ τ).
Whether comparisons of country-level estimates of cata-
strophic health expenditures result in consistent compari-
sons where one distribution exhibits restricted dominance
over the other is assessed through statistical tests (Additional
file 2). Testing for restricted dominance is thus valuable as it
enables consistent conclusions to be drawn regarding differ-
ences in financial protection across countries. For restricted
dominance testing to be applied to a measure, it must hold
a minimum of four properties akin to the axioms used in
the poverty framework to group poverty indices [32, 36].
The different measures of financial protection de-
scribed in Table 1 are (i) focused, insensitive to changes
above a threshold; (ii) population invariant, insensitive
to differences in population sizes due to adding an
exact replicate of a population; (iii) anonymous, in-
sensitive to interchanges in budget share levels; and (iv)
Table 1 Measuring catastrophic health expenditures
Headcount ratio: Share of the population spending τ% or more of household resources on OOP payments for healthP
h
mhwh1ðOOP shareh ≥ τÞP
h
mhwh
h denotes a household
mh denotes the number of members of household h
wh denotes the sampling weight of household h
1() is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if the condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise
τ denotes a catastrophic threshold
Approach Budget share Capacity-to-pay
Method Total expenditure Non-food expenditure Non-subsistence expenditure
OOP share oopexp
oop
exp−food
oop
exp−se
oop=OOP health payments
exp=total expenditure food=food expenditure se=subsistence expenditure
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Pareto-improving, indicating an increase in financial
protection as household resources increase [8].
Our approach for assessing sensitivity through restricted
dominance consisted of using an intersection-union type
of test under the null hypothesis of non-dominance
between the distributions of the OOP shares on health of
two countries. Specifically, H0: F^
A
OOP share− F^
B
OOP share ¼ 0.
In other words, we tested differences between each coun-
try’s share of the population with catastrophic health
expenditures conducted at each threshold along their
CDFs. Following Chen and Duclos (2008) [32] and Kaur
et al. (1994) [37], we employed tests based on the mini-
mum t-statistic approach over τ ∈ [τmin; τmax] of the t-
ratios of the differences between the catastrophic spending
curve (see Additional file 2). We did not test over the full
0–100% threshold range but over two partial ranges of 5–
85% and 5–40% with a one percentage point difference
such that testing occurred for a total of 81 and 36 points,
respectively. Testing was restricted above the lower 5% tail
of the distribution because the concern with catastrophic
health expenditures is for large OOP payments for health
relative to household resources. In addition, testing along
the upper tail of the distribution was also restricted: ini-
tially to 85% because of a concern for the power of the test
and need for a sufficient number of observations for con-
ducting t-tests, and subsequently to 40% because this is
the highest threshold commonly used in the literature. It
is expected that as the range of testing decreases, the like-
lihood of dominance increases.
The null hypothesis of non-dominance was rejected at
the 10% level if the absolute value of all observed t-
statistics was greater than 1.645, the critical value of the
t-distribution. Rejection was at the 10% level to account
for fewer observations at tails of the distribution. In
these instances, the alternative hypothesis of dominance
was not rejected, implying that one country’s headcount
ratio of catastrophic health expenditures is always statis-
tically significantly below the other within the range of
thresholds tested. Furthermore, if the t-statistic was
positive[negative], we inferred Country A[B] dominance.
Failure to reject the null of non-dominance could be
attributed to either: (i) insignificance, intervals of where
the CDFs were not significantly different (absolute value
of the t-statistic less than 1.645) or (ii) intersection, in-
tervals where the CDFs crossed at least once (absolute
value of t-statistic greater than 1.645 and signs of the
t-statistic changed for any given pairwise comparison).
Different dominance relationships are illustrated in
Fig. 1. Figure 1a shows a descending CDF of catastrophic
health expenditures for one country and describes how
the CDF gives the probability of the population spending
τ percent or more of household resources on health,
where each point of a CDF is equivalent to the incidence
rate of catastrophic health expenditures at threshold τ –
referred to by Wagstaff as a ‘catastrophic spending curve’
[35]. Figure 1b illustrates a pairwise comparison result-
ing in dominance for the country exhibiting a lower
CDF (i.e. lower levels of catastrophic health expendi-
tures) and Fig. 1c and 1d resulting in non-dominance
due to intersections and insignificance. Dominance and
the type of non-dominance should ultimately be estab-
lished through statistical tests.
For each method of constructing OOP shares on health,
we assessed the frequency and proportion of comparisons
exhibiting dominance (indicating cross-country assess-
ments insensitive to the choice of the threshold) across all
possible 2162 pairwise comparisons. A higher proportion
of dominance is preferable as it increases confidence in
the reliability of cross-country assessments. We also
assessed the frequency and proportion of comparisons
resulting in non-dominance (indicating assessments sensi-
tive to the threshold) due to differences in CDFs found to
be insignificant and non-dominance due to intersections
of CDFs. Finally, we identified the longest continuous
threshold range over which observed t-statistics were sig-
nificant within each pairwise comparison and then aver-
aged this across all comparisons for each method of
defining household resources. A higher average length in-
dicates a longer interval of dominance and suggests that
the method is less sensitive to the threshold. The length
can also be considered an indirect assessment of the over-
all power to test for dominance as a longer range of sig-
nificance increases the ability to accept the alternative
hypothesis of dominance.
The sensitivity of cross-country comparisons to
methods for defining available household resources was
also assessed. First, we compared the proportion of pair-
wise comparisons resulting in dominance when using
each method. The higher the proportion of comparisons
resulting in dominance, the less sensitive is that method
for defining household resources compared to another.
Second, we computed Spearman’s rank correlation coef-
ficient of country rankings across each method. Rather
than rank countries based on their incidence rate of
catastrophic health expenditures at a single threshold,
we ranked country distributions of OOP shares re-
stricted to part of the catastrophic incidence curve over
the popular 5–40% threshold range. Thus, for each
method, countries were ranked by counting the number
of pairwise comparisons for which the incidence rate of
catastrophic health expenditures in one country was al-
ways statistically lower than another country over the
entire popular threshold range of 5–40%, minus the
number of pairwise comparisons for which the incidence
rate was always statistically higher. If a pairwise com-
parison resulted in non-dominance, it was ignored since
it does not allow for an unambiguous ordering of
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countries. The higher a country’s rank, the more fre-
quently its incidence rates were lower than higher com-
pared to other countries. This assessment thus indicates
the sensitivity of country rankings to using different
methods to define household resources.
Results
Across all three methods for measuring catastrophic
health expenditures, on average, just over a fifth (21.5%) of
all possible 2162 country comparisons resulted in rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hy-
pothesis of dominance (Table 2). In other words, only 465
of the total 2162 country comparisons resulted in domin-
ance or a consistent assessment of a country’s incidence
rate of catastrophic health expenditures relative to an-
other; in contrast, 1697 out of 2162 comparisons resulted
in non-dominance or an inconsistent assessment such
that, depending on the choice of the threshold, a country’s
incidence rate was sometimes better and sometimes worse
than another. Thus, a country’s assessment of financial
protection relative to another was sensitive to the choice
of the threshold over the 5–85% range. The degree of sen-
sitivity to the threshold varied depending on the method
for defining household resources. Following the budget
share approach where OOP shares on health are con-
structed using total expenditure in the denominator, the
null hypothesis of dominance was rejected for only 10.7%
of comparisons (i.e. 232 of 2162 comparisons resulted in
a b
c d
Fig. 1 Illustration and interpretation of descending cumulative distribution functions for catastrophic health expenditures.
All figures show a descending cumulative distribution function of OOP shares on health in household resources (also referred to as a
‘catastrophic incidence curve’). The y-axis represents the proportion of the population whose OOP shares on health in household resources meet or
exceed threshold τ, and the x-axis shows the range of catastrophic thresholds τ. Any point on the curve can thus be interpreted as the incidence rate
of catastrophic health expenditures for a given threshold. In (a), the cumulative distribution function shows that 15% of the population
are spending 25% or more of household resources on OOP payments for health. In (b), Country A is said to exhibit dominance over
Country B given its catastrophic incidence curve is always below that of Country A. In other words, the proportion of its population
facing catastrophic health expenditures (y-axis) is always lower than Country B, no matter the threshold (x-axis). In (c), Country A and
Country B exhibit non-dominance due to intersection given their catastrophic incidence curves intersect at the 12% threshold. This means that the
proportion of the population in Country A facing catastrophic health expenditures is lower than Country B for thresholds below 12% but is higher than
Country B for thresholds above 12%. In (d), Country A and Country B exhibit non-dominance due to insignificance given their catastrophic incidence
curves differ but not to a statistically significant degree. This means that the proportion of the population in Country A facing catastrophic health
expenditures differs from the proportion of the population in Country B facing catastrophic health expenditures but the difference is insignificant
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consistent assessments). This more than doubled when
using CTP approaches but still remained low, increasing
to 26.9% using non-subsistence expenditure and 27.0%
using non-food expenditure (582 and 584 out of 2162
comparisons resulted in consistent assessments, respect-
ively). In other words, at least three-quarters of compari-
sons were sensitive to the threshold, resulting in
inconsistent assessments where either of the two countries
was found to have higher and lower levels of financial pro-
tection depending on the threshold or where differences
between two countries were not statistically significant.
When assessing sensitivity by further restricting dom-
inance testing to the popular 5–40% threshold range, the
average proportion of robust assessments increased to
approximately half of all comparisons. The budget share
approach resulted in cross-country comparisons robust
to the choice of the threshold 50.0% of the time, com-
pared to the two CTP approaches which resulted in ro-
bust comparisons 55.6% and 55.7% of the time. Thus,
when sensitivity was assessed by restricting dominance
testing over the 5–40% threshold range, the choice of
method for defining available household resources mat-
tered less as sensitivities were of similar degrees.
As described in the methods section, cross-country com-
parisons resulting in non-dominance can be attributed to
either catastrophic incidence curves that intersect or curves
that differ from one another but not to a statistically signifi-
cant degree. Intersections give inconsistent assessments of
which country has statistically higher[lower] levels of finan-
cial protection depending on the threshold. Insignificances,
while less informative in that they are unable to find statisti-
cally significant differences between two countries, do not
result in contradictions. Dominance testing over the 5–85%
threshold range indicated that cross-country comparisons
following the budget share approach resulted in a slightly
lower proportion of inconsistent comparisons or non-
dominance due to intersections (26.7%) than either of the
two CTP approaches (34.6% and 34.3%) (Table 2). When
testing was further restricted to the 5–40% threshold range,
the proportion of cross-country comparisons resulting in
non-dominance due to intersections was slightly lower and
similar whether using the budget share approach (19.5%) or
either CTP approaches (22.9% and 22.4%).
Table 2 also shows the average length of a continuous
range of threshold points over which significant t-statistics
were found according to each method for defining house-
hold resources. The length of this interval indicates over
what threshold range comparisons result in consistent as-
sessments and is indicative of the degree of sensitivity of
relative country assessments to methods for defining
household resources in the denominator, as well as the
power of the dominance test to reject the null hypothesis.
Results showed that CTP approaches appeared to be less
sensitive and had greater power than the budget share ap-
proach over the 5–85% threshold range as the average
threshold range over which dominance or consistent re-
sults were observed was always greater (60.1 and 59.8
threshold points for non-food and non-subsistence, re-
spectively; compared with 48.9 threshold points for total
expenditures). When dominance tests were further re-
stricted to the 5–40% range, the CTP approaches still ap-
peared to be less sensitive and to have greater power than
the budget share method. However, the difference was di-
minished as interval lengths were more similar, ranging
from 27.9 to 30.0 threshold points.
Additional file 3 shows results of dominance tests for
each country for each of the three methods. Fig. 2 is
shown here as an example, highlighting results for
Pakistan. The x-axis shows the range of thresholds for
when the share of OOP payments for health in household
resources can be considered as catastrophic. The y-axis
shows pairwise country comparisons between Pakistan
and other countries. Solid bars reflect when Pakistan
(Country A) exhibited a statistically lower incidence of
catastrophic health expenditures) than another Country B.
Dashed bars reflect when Country B exhibited lower inci-
dence of catastrophe than Pakistan (Country A). The
length of these bars reflects thresholds over which t-
Table 2 Analysis of dominance between country distribution functions of OOP shares on health
Approach Budget share Capacity-to-pay
Method Total expenditure Non-food expenditure Non-subsistence expenditure
Threshold range 5–85% 5–40% 5–85% 5–40% 5–85% 5–40%
Dominance relationship (frequency (proportion))
Dominance (restricted) 232 (10.7%) 1082 (50.0%) 584 (27.0%) 1202 (55.6%) 582 (26.9%) 1200 (55.5%)
Non-dominance due to insignificance 1352 (62.5%) 658 (30.4%) 830 (38.4%) 466 (21.6%) 838 (38.8%) 478 (22.1%)
Non-dominance due to intersections 578 (26.7%) 422 (19.5%) 748 (34.6%) 494 (22.9%) 742 (34.3%) 484 (22.4%)
Average length of dominance/Power of test 48.9 27.9 60.1 30.0 59.8 30.0
Dominance (restricted): one catastrophic incidence curve is always statistically above[below] another for a specified range of thresholds
Non-dominance due to insignificance: catastrophic incidence curves where the difference between curves is not statistically significant
Non-dominance due to intersections: catastrophic incidence curves that intersect and where difference between curves are statistically significant
Average length of dominance/Power of test: average continuous threshold range over which dominance was observed; considered an indirect assessment of the
overall power to test for dominance
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Fig. 2 (See legend on next page.)
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statistics used for assessing dominance were significant.
Dominance was observed when a bar is continuously
shown over the full threshold range of interest. Non-
dominance due to intersecting CDFs was observed in lines
with both types of solid and dashed bars, indicating that
Pakistan exhibited both lower and higher incidence rates of
catastrophe compared to Country B; and non-dominance
due to insignificant CDFs was observed in lines with white
space, indicating thresholds over which differences be-
tween Pakistan and Country B were insignificant. Figures
thus show the degree of sensitivity to the choice of the
threshold. For example, using the budget share method,
comparisons of Pakistan were insensitive to the threshold
with dominance shown by solid bars observed over
seven countries with higher levels of financial protec-
tion no matter the threshold over the 5–85% range
and over 28 countries over the 5–40% range. Some
sensitivities to the threshold were observed in com-
parisons with Ukraine, Turkey, Laos, Rwanda, Cape
Verde, Zambia, and Armenia with Pakistan observed
to have higher incidence rates at lower thresholds
(reflected by dashed bars) but lower incidence rates at
higher thresholds (reflected by solid bars) for all compari-
sons except that with Ukraine where the opposite was ob-
served. As seen here and in Additional file 3, the two CTP
methods show almost identical profiles or degrees of sensi-
tivities to the threshold.
When assessing sensitivity of cross-country comparisons
to methods for defining household resources, all three
methods were highly sensitive with at least three-quarters of
comparisons dependent on the threshold (Table 2). Over
the 5–40% range, comparisons were sensitive for approxi-
mately half of comparisons with similar degrees of sensitivity
across methods. Sensitivity was also assessed by estimating
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between country
rankings of financial protection by each method (Table 3).
The correlation was very strong between CTP methods
using non-food and non-subsistence expenditure (r = .9963,
p < .05), indicating nearly identical assessments of cross-
country comparisons. In comparison, the correlation for
each of these CTP methods with the budget share method
was moderately strong (r = .7226 and r = .7171, p < .05).
Discussion
This study is the one of the first published analyses to
investigate the sensitivity of measuring financial protec-
tion against catastrophic health expenditures to varying
methodological choices. These choices relate to the
threshold used to identify health expenditures as cata-
strophic, causing a sacrifice of consumption on other es-
sential items, and to the definition of living standards or
household resources available to pay for health services.
This paper is a methodological not a policy analysis and
thus does not attempt to draw policy insight about the
performance of any one country relative to another – the
unit of analysis is methods of measurement rather than
countries. In order for comparative assessments to be
meaningful and to more effectively draw insight for policy,
it is critical to understand how sensitive measurement is
to these choices.
Defining the catastrophic threshold requires a choice.
While more recent work has attempted to link this
choice to disease outcomes or other factors of clinical
relevance [38, 39], the choice of the threshold has also
been referred to as arbitrarily defined [6, 40–42]. The
choice would not be especially problematic if compara-
tive assessments were insensitive to the threshold, but
our results indicated this was not the case. Across all
methods for measuring catastrophic health expenditures,
country comparisons were robust to the choice of the
threshold in only a tenth to a quarter of all comparisons
Table 3 Correlation of country rankings of catastrophic health expenditure incidence rates over the 5–40% threshold range
Total expenditure Non-food expenditure Non-subsistence expenditure
Total expenditure 1.0000
Non-food expenditure 0.7226* 1.0000
Non-subsistence expenditure 0.7171* 0.9963* 1.0000
Tested using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
*p < 0.05
(See figure on previous page.)
Fig. 2 Example of sensitivity in cross-country comparisons to the choice of the threshold, observed through dominance.
Each line represents a pairwise comparison of the incidence rates of catastrophic health expenditures between Country A and Country B. Countries
are ordered by decreasing proportion of the population reporting any OOP. Solid bars indicate Country A dominance as it exhibited lower incidence
rates of catastrophic health expenditures compared to Country B for the range of thresholds shown on the horizontal axis. Dashed bars indicate
Country B dominance as it exhibited lower incidence rates of catastrophic health expenditures compared to Country A for the range of thresholds
shown on the horizontal axis. White bars indicate that the difference between incidence rates of catastrophic health expenditures between Country A
and Country B were not statistically significant for the range of thresholds shown on the horizontal axis. For any given pairwise comparison, one can
therefore observe for which thresholds Country A has higher[lower] incidence rates of catastrophic health expenditures compared to Country B, and
whether such assessments are sensitive to the choice of the threshold (i.e. if the type of bars displayed changes)
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within the 5–85% threshold range. If comparisons were
restricted within the 5–40% threshold range, the propor-
tion of assessments insensitive to the threshold increased
to approximately half of all comparisons across all
methods, with slightly more for CTP approaches. These
results signal a challenge for global monitoring given
that sensitivity reduces the ability to confidently draw re-
liable conclusions from cross-country comparisons as,
depending on the threshold, a country could be assessed
to perform relatively better and worse than another.
Regarding the choice for how to define household re-
sources, dominance results revealed that the degree of
sensitivity of cross-country comparisons using either the
budget share or the two CTP approaches were all highly
sensitive with almost three-quarters of comparisons sen-
sitive over the 5–85% range. It is important to note that
some of the sensitivity in CTP approaches may be par-
tially due to indicator construction. This is linked to dif-
ferences in food spending patterns where populations at
lower levels of socio-economic status in countries at
lower levels of economic development will spend pro-
portionally more on food then those at higher levels.
While this by-product of CTP approaches may lead to
intersections in catastrophic incidence curves, it is also
why such approaches are sometimes preferred as this
property does take into account differences in socio-
economic levels of development and attaches greater
concern to equity. When assessing sensitivity over the
5–40% range, these were sensitive to a similar degree
across all methods with approximately half of compari-
sons sensitive, although CTP approaches were slightly
less so. Correlations across country rankings were also
moderate across those produced by the budget share
and both CTP methods and were very strong between
the two CTP methods. Thus, the choice of the denomin-
ator and whether non-discretionary expenditures should
be considered part of household resources available to
pay for health has less practical implications for meas-
urement than the choice of the threshold. Furthermore,
all sensitivity results from CTP methods using non-food
and non-subsistence expenditure were nearly identical.
Given the two methods are conceptually related, as both
exclude some or all food expenditure from the estimate of
resources available to spend on health, the non-food
method is preferable of the two as it is easier to compute
and understand. The choice to define household resources
following either the budget share or a CTP method repre-
sents an important normative choice. This is because CTP
approaches are typically motivated by an ethical concern
for the poor, given it recognises that poorer households
spend a higher proportion of resources on essential items.
We recommend that the measurement of financial pro-
tection against catastrophic health expenditures should
not be pinned to a single threshold as country assessments
are sensitive to this methodological choice. In addition,
financial protection has gradations of coverage rather than
the simplistic protected or not protected categorisation
offered by a single threshold. Measuring catastrophic
health expenditures using only one point would result in a
significant loss of information, failing to capture different
degrees of hardship. The impact of OOP payments for
health is not discrete but rather the financial burden they
impose lies on a continuum from a very low burden where
the impact is marginal, to a moderate burden where the
impact may render access to some care unaffordable, to a
very high burden where OOP payments cause severe finan-
cial hardship. Thus, measuring across multiple thresholds
offers a more nuanced picture of the varying intensity of fi-
nancial hardship due to paying for health by a population.
We further recommend that financial protection against
catastrophic health expenditures be measured across a
range of thresholds using catastrophic incidence curves as
shown in this paper. Doing so would provide valuable pol-
icy insight as different health financing policies will impact
different levels of OOP payments. For example, a country
with specific policies for reducing copayments for in-
patient services will provide more financial protection at
higher thresholds of catastrophic health expenditures but
not necessarily at lower thresholds. Specific policies tai-
lored to country contexts might therefore explain why
cross-country comparisons of financial protection are so
sensitive to the threshold. It is important to evaluate how
and why the system produces those patterns – analysing
the pathways and interactions between policy interven-
tions and health financing arrangements (e.g. prepayment
and pooling, definition of the benefit package, cost-
sharing arrangements, provider incentives) and how these
influence financial protection. Financial protection is likely
to improve if fragmentation in the financing system is re-
duced because risks are then increasingly pooled across
the rich and poor and across the healthy and sick; if the
definition of a benefit package is better defined to meet
population health needs; if cost-sharing arrangements no
longer allow for balanced billing; if referral systems are
strengthened; and if perverse incentives inherent in open-
ended fee-for-service provider payment methods are
addressed. Indeed, the value of measuring financial
protection is to not only assess the impact of OOP
payments for health on living standards but also to under-
stand how a country’s health financing system performs in
terms of fulfilling an insurance function, linking back to
the theoretical foundations of financial protection in
health insurance. Indeed, Wagstaff et al. (2018) found that
population coverage by a health insurance scheme is not
strongly associated with the incidence rate of catastrophic
health expenditures [43], further warranting investigation
into design and implementation issues of insurance
schemes for their influence on financial protection.
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This study relied on a novel application of the domin-
ance approach to studying distributions of OOP shares on
health across a range of catastrophic thresholds. Other
methodological studies have focused on either the choice
of threshold or definition of living standards. Two studies
by Ataguba et al. (2012) [6] and by Onoka et al. (2011) [7]
examined implications when a single catastrophic thresh-
old was applied uniformly and when it was varied to
increase as a function of income, questioning the assump-
tion that the threshold should be constant across rich and
poor individuals alike. They found that allowing the
threshold to vary increased estimated levels of cata-
strophic health expenditures [6, 7]. While these studies
examined the application of the threshold, they did not
address the percentage at which the threshold should be
initially set. Other publications have focused on the defin-
ition of available household resources [4, 27, 30]. Wagstaff
and van Doorslaer (2003) [27] developed and compared in-
dicators following the budget share and CTP approaches,
discussing their underlying theoretical concepts. Xu et al.
(2003) [4, 30] further focused on CTP approaches and pro-
posed a method motivated by a concern for fairness. These
studies are noteworthy for developing methods popularly
used today, but the evidence base for understanding the
impact of varying the catastrophic threshold and the defin-
ition of household resources is still currently limited.
Key strengths and limitations of this analysis merit dis-
cussion. This study is one of the first analyses of the sen-
sitivity of financial protection measures that relies on
household expenditure surveys across many countries.
Previous studies using expenditure surveys were done
to produce global estimates or to assess determinants
of financial protection but did not examine sensitivity
across methods [30, 31, 43, 44]. Other multi-country
studies with a methodological objective relied on
health-specific surveys [8, 19]. Evidence shows that
expenditure surveys provide more accurate estimation
of OOP payments for health relative to other spend-
ing than if such data were collected from health-
specific surveys [45].
A second strength of this study is that it comprehen-
sively examined the impact of methodological choices in
both the threshold and definition of household re-
sources. First, sensitivity to the choice of the threshold
was examined using a dominance approach. Second,
sensitivity to the choice of the denominator in OOP
shares on health was examined through comparisons of
dominance results and correlation tests of country
rankings of financial protection based on different
methods for defining household resources. This study
thus adds to the evidence base in a way not previously
done. Given there is no unanimity on a gold standard
nor understanding as to whether these choices ultim-
ately matter, we provide new insight regarding the
impact of methodological choices by empirically estimat-
ing the impact of varying methodological choices.
A first limitation of this analysis is that our analysis
examined only a sample set of 47 surveys. It is import-
ant to keep in mind that the purpose of this analysis
was not to conduct a comparative analysis of country
performance but rather to assess sensitivity of country
performance to methodological choices, such that
country comparisons are not conclusive but illustrative.
The time period of surveys between 2002 and 2012 may
be considered as broad, however other global studies on
financial protection presented analyses covering a simi-
larly broad time period of 10-years [43, 44].
A second limitation is that the analysis relied on sur-
vey instruments that varied in design. While differences
in survey design (e.g. recall period, number of expend-
iture items) will influence estimates of expenditures, the
total effect is unclear [45]. Moreover, the same set of
data from varied survey instruments was consistently
used in all sensitivity analysis. It should also be noted
that these surveys were all developed by national statis-
tical offices and are systematically used to collect and
categorise information on household expenditure. Such
information is then consistently used for calculating
consumer price indices and for measuring poverty rates.
Thus, such variations in survey design are also a com-
mon issue in the global monitoring of other indicators,
including poverty which is also derived from the very
same income or expenditure surveys. To date, there is
no established method for standardising survey design
features in the collection of data on health spending.
This study explored methodological choices related to
conventional indicators of financial protection popularly
used in the literature and also adopted by international
monitoring frameworks [1]. Such indicators do not
capture the ex-ante value of reduced risk but rather the
ex-post financial burden faced because of the lack of pro-
tection. Despite popular use in the empirical literature,
these indicators have been criticised as being too narrow
[41, 46] and are likely to underestimate the broader ad-
verse effects of OOP payments for health given its focus
on direct medical costs and exclusion of indirect costs
such as those related to transport for accessing services,
loss of income due to illness, or coping strategies.
Conclusions
Global monitoring of financial protection against cata-
strophic health expenditures is challenging because there
are different measurement methods and no established
gold standard. To understand the challenge this might
pose in global monitoring, we examined the sensitivity
of cross-country comparisons to threshold points and to
measures of living standards defined by household re-
sources. We found moderate to high levels of sensitivity
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to the threshold such that drawing policy insight from
cross-country comparisons should be done cautiously as
interpretations could be limited if based on a single
threshold point. The sensitivity of comparisons to the
definition of household resources was also moderate to
high but was similar across methods, although CTP
approaches showed slightly less sensitivity. Hence, from a
measurement perspective, our findings clearly demon-
strate that the choice of the threshold matters most.
More valuable insight for policy can be gained by meas-
uring across a range of thresholds using a catastrophic inci-
dence curve as shown in this paper. This will allow for
assessing whether the financial burden is marginal at lower
thresholds of OOP shares on health, and/or more severe at
higher thresholds. An area for future research is the appli-
cation of such a measurement approach over time in a sin-
gle country. In addition, such an evaluation should seek to
evaluate not only changes in the catastrophic incidence
curve but also how these are linked to specific policy in-
tervention(s) and their interactions with the underlying
health financing system. Identifying and assessing in
which parts of the catastrophic incidence curve changes
are occurring and how and why these might be linked to
specific changes in health financing arrangements can
ultimately help improve the design and implementation of
related policies. Indeed, the point of measuring
catastrophic health expenditures is not only to monitor
the impact of OOP payments on living standards, but to
also evaluate how a country’s health financing system can
improve financial protection.
Endnotes
1This will occur for those households with similar
levels of total expenditure where actual food spending
by the poorer household is just below the fixed subsist-
ence expenditure amount and that by the richer house-
hold is just above. This is because CTP is defined as
total expenditure net of actual food spending when ac-
tual food spending is less than subsistence expenditure.
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